Philosophy of Law
NOTE: The following is partial and provisional only:
I. Anarchism: Is there a duty to obey the law?
M.B.E. Smith, Is There a Prima Facie Obligation to Obey the Law?, 82 Yale L.J. 950 (1973) [available on JSTOR]
William A. Edmundson, State of the Art: The Duty to Obey the Law, 10 Legal Theory 215 (2004) [available here or try here] pp. 245-52 only
II. What is a (legal) right?
Luís Duarte d'Almeida, Fundamental Legal Conceptions: The Hohfeldian Framework, 11 Philosophy Compass 554-69 (2016) available here
III. Is a duty to obey the law necessary for political legitimacy?
Arthur Isak Applbaum, Legitimacy without the Duty to Obey, 38 Philosophy and Public Affairs 215 (2010) [available on Wiley]
Read only: Introduction ( p. 215); first two paragraphs of section II
(pp. 217-18); section III (pp. 220-22); sections V-VII, pp. 224-233;
section IX, pp. 234-39.
IV. Theories of Law: An Introduction
Hart, The Concept of Law, Ch. I
V. Hart's critique of sanction theories
Hart, The Concept of Law, Chs. II-IV
VI. Hart's practice theory
Hart, The Concept of Law, Chs. V-VI
VII. The Planning Theory of Law
Scott Shapiro, The Planning Theory of Law
VIII. What is the rule of recognition for the American legal system?
Kent Greenawalt, The Rule of Recognition and the Constitution, 85 Mich. L. Rev. 621 (1987) [available on WESTLAW] - do not read Part II, pp. 624-30, or Part VIII.C, pp. 662-70
IX. The paradox of self-amendment
Reading: Alf Ross, On Self-Reference and a Puzzle in Constitutional Law, 78 Mind 1-24 (1969) [available on JSTOR] - read ONLY pp. 1-7 and pp. 20-24.
X. Dworkin's critique of Hart
Scott Shapiro, The Hart-Dworkin Debate: A Short Guide for the Perplexed [on SSRN] (read only up to p. 41)
Hart, The Concept of Law, Postscript
XI. The puzzle of authority and the nature of law
Joseph Raz, Authority, Law, and Morality, 68 Monist (1985) [available on JSTOR] - up to. 305 only
Scott Shapiro, Authority- up to p. 52 only
XII. Inclusive and exclusive legal positivism
Scott Shapiro, On Hart's Way Out, 4 Legal Theory 469 (1998) [here]
XII. The Moral Impact Theory of Law
Mark Greenberg, The Moral Impact Theory of Law, 123 Yale L.J. 1288 (2014)
XIV. Legal realism and rule-skepticism
Hart Ch. VII
Felix Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 Colum. L. Rev. 809 (1935) - pp. 809-12, 820-21, 834-49 only
XV. The relevance of semantics to legal interpretation
David Brink, Legal Theory, Legal Interpretation, and Judicial Review, 17 Phil. & Public Affairs 105-07, 111-24 (1988) [JSTOR]