Philosophy of Law Study Questions on Applbaum
What is wrong with Ladenson's view that legitimate authority is not a
moral power at all but merely a moral permission to coerce?
Applbaum may be right that in the clamdigger example the legal ruling
may not have created a duty on the clamdigger to comply and yet the
legal system could still have had legitimate authority. That is a
conceptual possibility. But is it plausible that the legal system would
have wanted it to create only a privilege on beachowner to put up the chain and a privilege on clamdigger to jump over it?
3) Same with motorist example - is Applbaum's power-liability account plausible as a view of what the law intended?
Government X has chosen to identify those in their country who are of
ethnic group A as the slaves of ethnic group B. When the Bs attempt to
enslave them, the As mount a violent resistance. This resistance is
morally permissible. A neighboring state invades and stops the
enslavement. This intervention is morally permissible
speaks of three conceptions of a state's legitimacy: 1)
legitimacy as moral claim-right of the ruler that entails a moral duty
to obey commands and a moral immunity of the ruler from coercive
interference in the exercise and enforcement of its legitimate rule
(this is the standard conception of legitimacy); 2) legitimacy as a
mere justification-right, a moral permission to use coercion without
commands of the ruler exercising any moral powers on those to whom they
are addressed (this is Ladenson's view); 3) and his "power-liability"
view in which legitimacy is a moral power exercised over the ruled, but
the ruler's command need not entail a duty to comply. Spell out the
three conceptions of legitimacy. Is it possible to describe Government
X's identification of the As as slaves as legitimate using Applbaum's
conception and why or why not?