Syllabus
Philosophy of Law
Spring 2020

NOTE: The following is partial and provisional only:

I. Anarchism: Is there a duty to obey the law?
    M.B.E. Smith, Is There a Prima Facie Obligation to Obey the Law?, 82 Yale L.J. 950 (1973) [available on JSTOR]
William A. Edmundson, State of the Art: The Duty to Obey the Law, 10 Legal Theory 215 (2004) [available here or try here] pp. 245-52 only
Study Questions
Study Questions
Study Questions

II. What is a (legal) right? 
Luís Duarte d'Almeida, Fundamental Legal Conceptions: The Hohfeldian Framework, 11 Philosophy Compass 554-69 (2016) available here

III. Is a duty to obey the law necessary for political legitimacy?
    Arthur Isak Applbaum, Legitimacy without the Duty to Obey, 38 Philosophy and Public Affairs 215 (2010) [available on Wiley]
    Read only: Introduction ( p. 215); first two paragraphs of section II (pp. 217-18); section III (pp. 220-22); sections V-VII, pp. 224-233; section IX, pp. 234-39.
Study Questions
Study Questions

IV. Theories of Law: An Introduction
    Hart, The Concept of Law, Ch. I
Study Questions

V. Hart's critique of sanction theories
    Hart, The Concept of Law, Chs. II-IV
Study Questions
Study Questions
   
VI. Hart's practice theory
    Hart, The Concept of Law, Chs. V-VI
Study Questions
Study Questions

VII. The Planning Theory of Law
     Scott Shapiro, The Planning Theory of Law

VIII. What is the rule of recognition for the American legal system?
    Kent Greenawalt, The Rule of Recognition and the Constitution, 85 Mich. L. Rev. 621 (1987) [available on WESTLAW] - do not read Part II, pp. 624-30, or Part VIII.C, pp. 662-70
Study Questions

IX. The paradox of self-amendment
    Reading: Alf Ross, On Self-Reference and a Puzzle in Constitutional Law, 78 Mind 1-24 (1969) [available on JSTOR] - read ONLY pp. 1-7 and pp. 20-24.
Study Questions

X. Dworkin's critique of Hart
    Scott Shapiro, The Hart-Dworkin Debate: A Short Guide for the Perplexed [on SSRN] (read only up to p. 41)
    Hart, The Concept of Law, Postscript
Study Questions

XI. The puzzle of authority and the nature of law
    Joseph Raz, Authority, Law, and Morality, 68 Monist (1985) [available on JSTOR] - up to. 305 only
    Scott Shapiro, Authority- up to p. 52 only

XII.  Inclusive and exclusive legal positivism
    Scott Shapiro, On Hart's Way Out, 4 Legal Theory 469 (1998) [here]

XII. The Moral Impact Theory of Law
    Mark Greenberg, The Moral Impact Theory of Law, 123 Yale L.J. 1288 (2014)

XIV. Legal realism and rule-skepticism
    Hart Ch. VII
Felix Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 Colum. L. Rev. 809 (1935) - pp. 809-12, 820-21, 834-49 only
Study Questions

XV. The relevance of semantics to legal interpretation
    David Brink, Legal Theory, Legal Interpretation, and Judicial Review, 17 Phil. & Public Affairs 105-07, 111-24 (1988) [JSTOR]