My work in the philosophy of law has largely concerned four topics:
1) the writings of Hans Kelsen,
the (general) irrelevance of the philosophy of language for the
law (or what I call “Dworkin’s
3) American legal realism, and
4) the structure of legal systems.
But I have also written on some issues in analytical jurisprudence, and I have done a bit of blogging on the philosophy of law.
A video of a response I gave to paper on Raz can be found here.
I have also posted reviews of articles in the philosophy of law on Jotwell, including:
Finlay & David Plunkett, Quasi-Expressivism about Statements of
Law: A Hartian Theory, in 3 Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Law 49
(John Gardner, Leslie Green & Brian Leiter eds., 2018).
M. Newman, Hohfeld and the Theory of In Rem Rights: An Attempted
Mediation in The Legacy of Wesley Hohfeld (forthcoming 2018)
Timothy Endicott, Comity among Authorities, 68 Current Legal Problems 1 (2015).
Scott Hershovitz, The End of Jurisprudence, 124 Yale L.J. 1160 (2015)
Ronald Dworkin, A New Philosophy for International Law, 41 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 2 (2013)
Karl N. Llewellyn, The Theory of Rules, edited and with an introduction by Frederick Schauer (Univ. of Chicago Press, 2011)
Caleb Nelson, A Critical Guide to Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 54 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. (forthcoming 2013)
Jeffrey Brand-Ballard, Innocents Lost: Proportional Sentencing and the Paradox of Collateral Damage, 15 Legal Theory 67 (2009)
Julie Dickson, Is the Rule of Recognition Really a Conventional Rule?, 27 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 373 (2007)