SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
WANDA KRUPSKI, PETITIONER v. COSTA
CROCIERE S. p. A.
on writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the
eleventh circuit
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[June 7, 2010]
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Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion of the
Court.
Rule 15(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure governs when an amended pleading “relates back” to the date
of a timely filed original pleading and is thus itself timely even
though it was filed outside an applicable statute of limitations. Where
an amended pleading changes a party or a party’s name, the Rule
requires, among other things, that “the party to be brought in by
amendment … knew or should have known that the action would have been
brought against it, but for a mistake concerning the proper party’s
identity.” Rule 15(c)(1)(C). In this case, the Court of Appeals held
that Rule 15(c) was not satisfied because the plaintiff knew or should
have known of the proper defendant before filing her original
complaint. The court also held that relation back was not appropriate
because the plaintiff had unduly delayed in seeking to amend. We hold
that relation back under Rule 15(c)(1)(C) depends on what the party to
be added knew or should have known, not on the amending party’s
knowledge or its timeliness in seeking to amend the pleading.
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
I
On February 21, 2007, petitioner, Wanda
Krupski, tripped over a cable and fractured her femur while she was on
board the cruise ship Costa Magica. Upon her return home, she acquired
counsel and began the process of seeking compensation for her injuries.
Krupski’s passenger ticket—which explained that it was the sole
contract between each passenger and the carrier, App. to Pet. for Cert.
37a—included a variety of requirements for obtaining damages for an
injury suffered on board one of the carrier’s ships. The ticket
identified the carrier as
“Costa Crociere S. p. A., an Italian corporation, and all Vessels and
other ships owned, chartered, operated, marketed or provided by Costa
Crociere, S. p. A., and all officers, staff members, crew members,
independent contractors, medical providers, concessionaires, pilots,
suppliers, agents and assigns onboard said Vessels, and the
manufacturers of said Vessels and all their component parts.” Id., at
27a.
The ticket required an injured party to submit “written notice of the
claim with full particulars … to the carrier or its duly authorized
agent within 185 days after the date of injury.” Id., at 28a. The
ticket further required any lawsuit to be “filed within one year after
the date of injury” and to be “served upon the carrier within 120 days
after filing.” Ibid. For cases arising from voyages departing from or
returning to a United States port in which the amount in controversy
exceeded $75,000, the ticket designated the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Florida in Broward County, Florida,
as the exclusive forum for a lawsuit. Id., at 36a. The ticket extended
the “defenses, limitations and exceptions … that may be invoked by the
CARRIER” to “all persons who may act on behalf of the CARRIER or on
whose behalf the CARRIER may act,” including “the CARRIER’s parents,
subsidiaries, affiliates, successors, assigns, representatives, agents,
employees, servants, concessionaires and contractors” as well as “Costa
Cruise Lines N. V.,” identified as the “sales and marketing agent for
the CARRIER and the issuer of this Passage Ticket Contract.” Id., at
29a. The front of the ticket listed Costa Cruise Lines’ address in
Florida and stated that an entity called “Costa Cruises” was “the first
cruise company in the world” to obtain a certain certification of
quality. Id., at 25a.
On July 2, 2007, Krupski’s counsel notified
Costa Cruise Lines of Krupski’s claims. App. 69–70. On July 9, 2007,
the claims administrator for Costa Cruise requested additional
information from Krupski “[i]n order to facilitate our future attempts
to achieve a pre-litigation settlement.” App. to Pet. for Cert.
23a–24a. The parties were unable to reach a settlement, however, and on
February 1, 2008—three weeks before the 1-year limitations period
expired—Krupski filed a negligence action against Costa Cruise,
invoking the diversity jurisdiction of the Federal District Court for
the Southern District of Florida. The complaint alleged that Costa
Cruise “owned, operated, managed, supervised and controlled” the ship
on which Krupski had injured herself; that Costa Cruise had extended to
its passengers an invitation to enter onto the ship; and that Costa
Cruise owed Krupski a duty of care, which it breached by failing to
take steps that would have prevented her accident. App. 23–26. The
complaint further stated that venue was proper under the passenger
ticket’s forum selection clause and averred that, by the July 2007
notice of her claims, Krupski had complied with the ticket’s presuit
requirements. Id., at 23. Krupski served Costa Cruise on February 4,
2008.
Over the next several months—after the
limitations period had expired—Costa Cruise brought Costa Crociere’s
existence to Krupski’s attention three times. First, on February 25,
2008, Costa Cruise filed its answer, asserting that it was not the
proper defendant, as it was merely the North American sales and
marketing agent for Costa Crociere, which was the actual carrier and
vessel operator. Id., at 31. Second, on March 20, 2008, Costa Cruise
listed Costa Crociere as an interested party in its corporate
disclosure statement. App. to Pet. for Cert. 20a. Finally, on May 6,
2008, Costa Cruise moved for summary judgment, again stating that Costa
Crociere was the proper defendant. App. 5, 33–38.
On June 13, 2008, Krupski responded to Costa
Cruise’s motion for summary judgment, arguing for limited discovery to
determine whether Costa Cruise should be dismissed. According to
Krupski, the following sources of information led her to believe Costa
Cruise was the responsible party: The travel documents prominently
identified Costa Cruise and gave its Florida address; Costa Cruise’s
Web site listed Costa Cruise in Florida as the United States office for
the Italian company Costa Crociere; and the Web site of the Florida
Department of State listed Costa Cruise as the only “Costa” company
registered to do business in that State. Id., at 43–45, 56–59. Krupski
also observed that Costa Cruise’s claims administrator had responded to
her claims notification without indicating that Costa Cruise was not a
responsible party. Id., at 45. With her response, Krupski
simultaneously moved to amend her complaint to add Costa Crociere as a
defendant. Id., at 41–42, 52–54.
On July 2, 2008, after oral argument, the
District Court denied Costa Cruise’s motion for summary judgment
without prejudice and granted Krupski leave to amend, ordering that
Krupski effect proper service on Costa Crociere by September 16, 2008.
Id., at 71–72. Complying with the court’s deadline, Krupski filed an
amended complaint on July 11, 2008, and served Costa Crociere on August
21, 2008. Id., at 73, 88–89. On that same date, the District Court
issued an order dismissing Costa Cruise from the case pursuant to the
parties’ joint stipulation, Krupski apparently having concluded that
Costa Cruise was correct that it bore no responsibility for her
injuries. Id., at 85–86.
Shortly thereafter, Costa Crociere—represented
by the same counsel who had represented Costa Cruise, compare id., at
31, with id., at 100—moved to dismiss, contending that the amended
complaint did not relate back under Rule 15(c) and was therefore
untimely. The District Court agreed. App. to Pet. for Cert. 8a–22a.
Rule 15(c), the court explained, imposes three requirements before an
amended complaint against a newly named defendant can relate back to
the original complaint. First, the claim against the newly named
defendant must have arisen “out of the conduct, transaction, or
occurrence set out—or attempted to be set out—in the original
pleading.” Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 15(c)(1)(B), (C). Second, “within the
period provided by Rule 4(m) for serving the summons and complaint”
(which is ordinarily 120 days from when the complaint is filed, see
Rule 4(m)), the newly named defendant must have “received such notice
of the action that it will not be prejudiced in defending on the
merits.” Rule 15(c)(1)(C)(i). Finally, the plaintiff must show that,
within the Rule 4(m) period, the newly named defendant “knew or should
have known that the action would have been brought against it, but for
a mistake concerning the proper party’s identity.” Rule
15(c)(1)(C)(ii).
The first two conditions posed no problem, the
court explained: The claim against Costa Crociere clearly involved the
same occurrence as the original claim against Costa Cruise, and Costa
Crociere had constructive notice of the action and had not shown that
any unfair prejudice would result from relation back. App. to Pet. for
Cert. 14a–18a. But the court found the third condition fatal to
Krupski’s attempt to relate back, concluding that Krupski had not made
a mistake concerning the identity of the proper party. Id., at 18a–21a.
Relying on Eleventh Circuit precedent, the court explained that the
word “mistake” should not be construed to encompass a deliberate
decision not to sue a party whose identity the plaintiff knew before
the statute of limitations had run. Because Costa Cruise informed
Krupski that Costa Crociere was the proper defendant in its answer,
corporate disclosure statement, and motion for summary judgment, and
yet Krupski delayed for months in moving to amend and then in filing an
amended complaint, the court concluded that Krupski knew of the proper
defendant and made no mistake.
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed in an
unpublished per curiam opinion. Krupski v. Costa Cruise Lines, N. V.,
LLC , 330 Fed. Appx. 892 (2009). Rather than relying on the information
contained in Costa Cruise’s filings, all of which were made after the
statute of limitations had expired, as evidence that Krupski did not
make a mistake, the Court of Appeals noted that the relevant
information was located within Krupski’s passenger ticket, which she
had furnished to her counsel well before the end of the limitations
period. Because the ticket clearly identified Costa Crociere as the
carrier, the court stated, Krupski either knew or should have known of
Costa Crociere’s identity as a potential party. 1 It was therefore
appropriate to treat Krupski as having chosen to sue one potential
party over another. Alternatively, even assuming that she first learned
of Costa Crociere’s identity as the correct party from Costa Cruise’s
answer, the Court of Appeals observed that Krupski waited 133 days from
the time she filed her original complaint to seek leave to amend and
did not file an amended complaint for another month after that. In
light of this delay, the Court of Appeals concluded that the District
Court did not abuse its discretion in denying relation
back.
We granted certiorari to resolve tension among
the Circuits over the breadth of Rule 15(c)(1)(C)(ii), 2 558 U. S. ___
(2010), and we now reverse.
II
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, an
amendment to a pleading relates back to the date of the original
pleading when:
“(A) the law that provides the applicable
statute of limitations allows relation back;
“(B) the amendment asserts a claim or defense
that arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out—or
attempted to be set out—in the original pleading; or
“(C) the amendment changes the party or the
naming of the party against whom a claim is asserted, if Rule
15(c)(1)(B) is satisfied and if, within the period provided by Rule
4(m) for serving the summons and complaint, the party to be brought in
by amendment:
“(i) received such notice of the action that
it will not be prejudiced in defending on the merits; and
“(ii) knew or should have known that the
action would have been brought against it, but for a mistake concerning
the proper party’s identity.” Rule 15(c)(1).
In our view, neither of the Court of Appeals’ reasons for denying
relation back under Rule 15(c)(1)(C)(ii) finds support in the text of
the Rule. We consider each reason in turn.
A
The Court of Appeals first decided that
Krupski either knew or should have known of the proper party’s identity
and thus determined that she had made a deliberate choice instead of a
mistake in not naming Costa Crociere as a party in her original
pleading. 330 Fed. Appx., at 895. By focusing on Krupski’s knowledge,
the Court of Appeals chose the wrong starting point. The question under
Rule 15(c)(1)(C)(ii) is not whether Krupski knew or should have known
the identity of Costa Crociere as the proper defendant, but whether
Costa Crociere knew or should have known that it would have been named
as a defendant but for an error. Rule 15(c)(1)(C)(ii) asks what the
prospective defendant knew or should have known during the Rule 4(m)
period, not what the plaintiff knew or should have known at the time of
filing her original complaint. 3
Information in the plaintiff’s possession is
relevant only if it bears on the defendant’s understanding of whether
the plaintiff made a mistake regarding the proper party’s identity. For
purposes of that inquiry, it would be error to conflate knowledge of a
party’s existence with the absence of mistake. A mistake is “[a]n
error, misconception, or misunderstanding; an erroneous belief.”
Black’s Law Dictionary 1092 (9th ed. 2009); see also Webster’s Third
New International Dictionary 1446 (2002) (defining “mistake” as “a
misunderstanding of the meaning or implication of something”; “a wrong
action or statement proceeding from faulty judgment, inadequate
knowledge, or inattention”; “an erroneous belief”; or “a state of mind
not in accordance with the facts”). That a plaintiff knows of a party’s
existence does not preclude her from making a mistake with respect to
that party’s identity. A plaintiff may know that a prospective
defendant—call him party A—exists, while erroneously believing him to
have the status of party B. Similarly, a plaintiff may know generally
what party A does while misunderstanding the roles that party A and
party B played in the “conduct, transaction, or occurrence” giving rise
to her claim. If the plaintiff sues party B instead of party A under
these circumstances, she has made a “mistake concerning the proper
party’s identity” notwithstanding her knowledge of the existence of
both parties. The only question under Rule 15(c)(1)(C)(ii), then, is
whether party A knew or should have known that, absent some mistake,
the action would have been brought against him.
Respondent urges that the key issue under Rule
15(c)(1)(C)(ii) is whether the plaintiff made a deliberate choice to
sue one party over another. Brief for Respondent 11–16. We agree that
making a deliberate choice to sue one party instead of another while
fully understanding the factual and legal differences between the two
parties is the antithesis of making a mistake concerning the proper
party’s identity. We disagree, however, with respondent’s position that
any time a plaintiff is aware of the existence of two parties and
chooses to sue the wrong one, the proper defendant could reasonably
believe that the plaintiff made no mistake. The reasonableness of the
mistake is not itself at issue. As noted, a plaintiff might know that
the prospective defendant exists but nonetheless harbor a
misunderstanding about his status or role in the events giving rise to
the claim at issue, and she may mistakenly choose to sue a different
defendant based on that misimpression. That kind of deliberate but
mistaken choice does not foreclose a finding that Rule 15(c)(1)(C)(ii)
has been satisfied.
This reading is consistent with the purpose of
relation back: to balance the interests of the defendant protected by
the statute of limitations with the preference expressed in the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure in general, and Rule 15 in particular, for
resolving disputes on their merits. See, e.g., Advisory Committee’s
1966 Notes 122; 3 Moore’s Federal Practice §§15.02[1],
15.19[3][a] (3d ed. 2009). A prospective defendant who legitimately
believed that the limitations period had passed without any attempt to
sue him has a strong interest in repose. But repose would be a windfall
for a prospective defendant who understood, or who should have
understood, that he escaped suit during the limitations period only
because the plaintiff misunderstood a crucial fact about his identity.
Because a plaintiff’s knowledge of the existence of a party does not
foreclose the possibility that she has made a mistake of identity about
which that party should have been aware, such knowledge does not
support that party’s interest in repose.
Our reading is also consistent with the
history of Rule 15(c)(1)(C). That provision was added in 1966 to
respond to a recurring problem in suits against the Federal Government,
particularly in the Social Security context. Advisory Committee’s 1966
Notes 122. Individuals who had filed timely lawsuits challenging the
administrative denial of benefits often failed to name the party
identified in the statute as the proper defendant—the current Secretary
of what was then the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare—and
named instead the United States; the Department of Health, Education,
and Welfare itself; the nonexistent “Federal Security Administration”;
or a Secretary who had recently retired from office. Ibid. By the time
the plaintiffs discovered their mistakes, the statute of limitations in
many cases had expired, and the district courts denied the plaintiffs
leave to amend on the ground that the amended complaints would not
relate back. Rule 15(c) was therefore “amplified to provide a general
solution” to this problem. Ibid. It is conceivable that the Social
Security litigants knew or reasonably should have known the identity of
the proper defendant either because of documents in their
administrative cases or by dint of the statute setting forth the filing
requirements. See 42 U. S. C. §405(g) (1958 ed., Supp. III).
Nonetheless, the Advisory Committee clearly meant their filings to
qualify as mistakes under the Rule.
...
B
The Court of Appeals offered a second reason
why Krupski’s amended complaint did not relate back: Krupski had unduly
delayed in seeking to file, and in eventually filing, an amended
complaint. 330 Fed. Appx., at 895. The Court of Appeals offered no
support for its view that a plaintiff’s dilatory conduct can justify
the denial of relation back under Rule 15(c)(1)(C), and we find none.
The Rule plainly sets forth an exclusive list of requirements for
relation back, and the amending party’s diligence is not among them.
Moreover, the Rule mandates relation back once the Rule’s requirements
are satisfied; it does not leave the decision whether to grant relation
back to the district court’s equitable discretion. See Rule 15(c)(1)
(“An amendment … relates back … when” the three listed requirements are
met (emphasis added)).
The mandatory nature of the inquiry for
relation back under Rule 15(c) is particularly striking in contrast to
the inquiry under Rule 15(a), which sets forth the circumstances in
which a party may amend its pleading before trial. By its terms, Rule
15(a) gives discretion to the district court in deciding whether to
grant a motion to amend a pleading to add a party or a claim. Following
an initial period after filing a pleading during which a party may
amend once “as a matter of course,” “a party may amend its pleading
only with the opposing party’s written consent or the court’s leave,”
which the court “should freely give … when justice so requires.” Rules
15(a)(1)–(2). We have previously explained that a court may consider a
movant’s “undue delay” or “dilatory motive” in deciding whether to
grant leave to amend under Rule 15(a). Foman v. Davis , 371 U. S. 178,
182 (1962) . As the contrast between Rule 15(a) and Rule 15(c) makes
clear, however, the speed with which a plaintiff moves to amend her
complaint or files an amended complaint after obtaining leave to do so
has no bearing on whether the amended complaint relates back. Cf. 6A C.
Wright, A. Miller, & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure
§1498, pp. 142–143, and nn. 49–50 (2d ed. 1990 and Supp. 2010).
Rule 15(c)(1)(C) does permit a court to
examine a plaintiff’s conduct during the Rule 4(m) period, but not in
the way or for the purpose respondent or the Court of Appeals suggests.
As we have explained, the question under Rule 15(c)(1)(C)(ii) is what
the prospective defendant reasonably should have understood about the
plaintiff’s intent in filing the original complaint against the first
defendant. To the extent the plaintiff’s postfiling conduct informs the
prospective defendant’s understanding of whether the plaintiff
initially made a “mistake concerning the proper party’s identity,” a
court may consider the conduct. Cf. Leonard v. Parry , 219 F. 3d 25, 29
(CA1 2000) (“[P]ost-filing events occasionally can shed light on the
plaintiff’s state of mind at an earlier time” and “can inform a
defendant’s reasonable beliefs concerning whether her omission from the
original complaint represented a mistake (as opposed to a conscious
choice)”). The plaintiff’s postfiling conduct is otherwise immaterial
to the question whether an amended complaint relates back. 5
C
Applying these principles to the facts of this
case, we think it clear that the courts below erred in denying relation
back under Rule 15(c)(1)(C)(ii). The District Court held that Costa
Crociere had “constructive notice” of Krupski’s complaint within the
Rule 4(m) period. App. to Pet. for Cert. 15a–17a. Costa Crociere has
not challenged this finding. Because the complaint made clear that
Krupski meant to sue the company that “owned, operated, managed,
supervised and controlled” the ship on which she was injured, App. 23,
and also indicated (mistakenly) that Costa Cruise performed those
roles, id., at 23–27, Costa Crociere should have known, within the Rule
4(m) period, that it was not named as a defendant in that complaint
only because of Krupski’s misunderstanding about which “Costa” entity
was in charge of the ship—clearly a “mistake concerning the proper
party’s identity.”
Respondent contends that because the original
complaint referred to the ticket’s forum requirement and presuit claims
notification procedure, Krupski was clearly aware of the contents of
the ticket, and because the ticket identified Costa Crociere as the
carrier and proper party for a lawsuit, respondent was entitled to
think that she made a deliberate choice to sue Costa Cruise instead of
Costa Crociere. Brief for Respondent 13. As we have explained, however,
that Krupski may have known the contents of the ticket does not
foreclose the possibility that she nonetheless misunderstood crucial
facts regarding the two companies’ identities. Especially because the
face of the complaint plainly indicated such a misunderstanding,
respondent’s contention is not persuasive. Moreover, respondent has
articulated no strategy that it could reasonably have thought Krupski
was pursuing in suing a defendant that was legally unable to provide
relief.
Respondent also argues that Krupski’s failure
to move to amend her complaint during the Rule 4(m) period shows that
she made no mistake in that period. Id., at 13–14. But as discussed,
any delay on Krupski’s part is relevant only to the extent it may have
informed Costa Crociere’s understanding during the Rule 4(m) period of
whether she made a mistake originally. Krupski’s failure to add Costa
Crociere during the Rule 4(m) period is not sufficient to make
reasonable any belief that she had made a deliberate and informed
decision not to sue Costa Crociere in the first instance. 6 Nothing in
Krupski’s conduct during the Rule 4(m) period suggests that she failed
to name Costa Crociere because of anything other than a mistake.
It is also worth noting that Costa Cruise and
Costa Crociere are related corporate entities with very similar names;
“crociera” even means “cruise” in Italian. Cassell’s Italian Dictionary
137, 670 (1967). This interrelationship and similarity heighten the
expectation that Costa Crociere should suspect a mistake has been made
when Costa Cruise is named in a complaint that actually describes Costa
Crociere’s activities. Cf. Morel v. DaimlerChrysler AG , 565 F. 3d 20,
27 (CA1 2009) (where complaint conveyed plaintiffs’ attempt to sue
automobile manufacturer and erroneously named the manufacturer as
Daimler-Chrysler Corporation instead of the actual manufacturer, a
legally distinct but related entity named DaimlerChrysler AG, the
latter should have realized it had not been named because of
plaintiffs’ mistake); Goodman v. Praxair, Inc. , 494 F. 3d 458, 473–475
(CA4 2007) (en banc) (where complaint named parent company Praxair,
Inc., but described status of subsidiary company Praxair Services,
Inc., subsidiary company knew or should have known it had not been
named because of plaintiff’s mistake). In addition, Costa Crociere’s
own actions contributed to passenger confusion over “the proper party”
for a lawsuit. The front of the ticket advertises that “Costa Cruises”
has achieved a certification of quality, App. to Pet. for Cert. 25a,
without clarifying whether “Costa Cruises” is Costa Cruise Lines, Costa
Crociere, or some other related “Costa” company. Indeed, Costa Crociere
is evidently aware that the difference between Costa Cruise and Costa
Crociere can be confusing for cruise ship passengers. See, e.g., Suppa
v. Costa Crociere, S. p. A. , No. 07–60526–CIV, 2007 WL 4287508, *1,
(SD Fla., Dec. 4, 2007) (denying Costa Crociere’s motion to dismiss the
amended complaint where the original complaint had named Costa Cruise
as a defendant after “find[ing] it simply inconceivable that Defendant
Costa Crociere was not on notice … that … but for the mistake in the
original Complaint, Costa Crociere was the appropriate party to be
named in the action”).
In light of these facts, Costa Crociere should
have known that Krupski’s failure to name it as a defendant in her
original complaint was due to a mistake concerning the proper party’s
identity. We therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit and remand the case for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
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Notes
1 The Court of Appeals stated that it was “imput[ing]” knowledge
to Krupski. 330 Fed. Appx., at 895. Petitioner uses the terms “imputed
knowledge” and “constructive knowledge” interchangeably in her brief,
while respondent addresses only actual knowledge. Because we reject the
Court of Appeals’ focus on the plaintiff’s knowledge in the first
instance, see infra, at 8–13, the distinction among these types of
knowledge is not relevant to our resolution of this case.
2 See, e.g., Krupski v. Costa Cruise Lines, N. V., LLC, 330 Fed.
Appx. 892, 895 (CA11 2009) (per curiam) (case below); Rendall-Speranza
v. Nassim, 107 F. 3d 913, 918 (CADC 1997) (provision does not authorize
relation back where plaintiff “was fully aware of the potential
defendant’s identity but not of its responsibility for the harm
alleged”); Cornwell v. Robinson, 23 F. 3d 694, 705 (CA2 1994) (no
relation back where plaintiff knew the identities of the responsible
defendants and failed to name them); Goodman v. Praxair, Inc., 494 F.
3d 458, 469–470 (CA4 2007) (en banc) (rejecting argument that
plaintiff’s knowledge of proper corporate defendant’s existence and
name meant that no mistake had been made); Arthur v. Maersk, Inc., 434
F. 3d 196, 208 (CA3 2006) (“A ‘mistake’ is no less a ‘mistake’ when it
flows from lack of knowledge as opposed to inaccurate description”);
Leonard v. Parry, 219 F. 3d 25, 28–29 (CA1 2000) (plaintiff’s knowledge
of proper defendant’s identity was not relevant to whether she made a “
‘mistake concerning the identity of the proper party’ ”). We express no
view on whether these decisions may be reconciled with each other in
light of their specific facts and the interpretation of Rule
15(c)(1)(C)(ii) we adopt today.
3 Rule 15(c)(1)(C) speaks generally of an amendment to a
“pleading” that changes “the party against whom a claim is asserted,”
and it therefore is not limited to the circumstance of a plaintiff
filing an amended complaint seeking to bring in a new defendant.
Nevertheless, because the latter is the “typical case” of Rule
15(c)(1)(C)’s applicability, see 3 Moore’s Federal Practice
§15.19[2] (3d ed. 2009), we use this circumstance as a shorthand
throughout this opinion. See also id., §15.19[3][a]; Advisory
Committee’s 1966 Notes on Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 15, 28 U. S. C. App.,
pp. 122–123 (hereinafter Advisory Committee’s 1966 Notes).
...
5 Similarly, we reject respondent’s suggestion that Rule 15(c)
requires a plaintiff to move to amend her complaint or to file and
serve an amended complaint within the Rule 4(m) period. Rule
15(c)(1)(C)(i) simply requires that the prospective defendant has
received sufficient “notice of the action” within the Rule 4(m) period
that he will not be prejudiced in defending the case on the merits. The
Advisory Committee Notes to the 1966 Amendment clarify that “the notice
need not be formal.” Advisory Committee’s 1966 Notes 122.
6 The Court of Appeals concluded that Krupski was not diligent
merely because she did not seek leave to add Costa Crociere until 133
days after she filed her original complaint and did not actually file
an amended complaint for another a month after that. 330 Fed. Appx., at
895. It is not clear why Krupski should have been found dilatory for
not accepting at face value the unproven allegations in Costa Cruise’s
answer and corporate disclosure form. In fact, Krupski moved to amend
her complaint to add Costa Crociere within the time period prescribed
by the District Court’s scheduling order. See App. 3, 6–7; Record, Doc.
23, p. 1.