Questions on the Full Faith and Credit Due Judgments and the Interests
of the Forum
1) Consider Fauntleroy in the context of what you now know about
constitutional restrictions on choice of law. Does it make
sense to have weak constitutional obligations to apply another state's
law and strong constitutional obligations to recognize another state's
judgment, even when - by the forum lights - the foreign judgment
involved the misapplication (or indeed the unconstitutional
application) of law?
2) Why not understand the court as dismissing the action in Fauntleroy
for lack of jurisdiction? Would that make a difference?
In Yarborough, how would the case have turned out if Georgia, like most
states, allowed for the modification of child support judgments?
4) Given that South Carolina allows for the modification of South
Carolina child support judgments, why is South Carolina violating the
Full Faith and Credit clause by requiring that a Georgia child support
judgment be subject to modification as well? South Carolina is
respecting the Georgia judgment to exactly the same extent that it
respects its own judgments. Why isn't that enough to satisfy the clause?
5) There is no question that South Carolina has a Pacific Employer's
interest in the application of its law to this case. Since that's so,
why can't South Carolina apply South Carolina rather than Georgia res
judicata law in Yarborough?
5) Is Georgia violating the Constitution by not allowing its child
support judgments to be modified? (Consider the discussion of Kovacs v.
Brewer on pp. 494-95 in the 7th ed.and pp. 490-91 357 in
the 8th ed. in this
regard.) What would happen in
Yarborough if Georgia were violating the Constitution?