I have written a number papers on the conflict of laws (and have a number of other pieces in progress):

Choice of Law as General Common Law: A Reply to Professor Brilmayer, in Donald Earl Childress III (ed.), The Role of Ethics in Private International Law 125-35 (Cambridge University Press, 2011)

This is a brief response to a book chapter by Lea Brilmayer. In it, I explore a number of hurdles that must be faced by the position, advocated by Brilmayer, Kim Roosevelt, and Larry Kramer, that courts should respect a state's choice-of-law rules when deciding whether to apply the state's law. 

The Return of the Unprovided-For Case, 51 Georgia Law Review 761-804 (2017)

This is one salvo in a comprehensive attack on interest analysis - the dominant choice-of-law approach in the United States. The heart of my argument is that interest analysis improperly focuses only on the purposes standing behind enacted laws, ignoring the purposes that were sacrificed when the law was enacted. These sacrificed purposes can become crucial in a conflicts case, as unprovided-for cases show.

Legal Monism: An American History, in Christoph Bezemek, Michael Potacs and Alexander Somek (eds.), Vienna Lectures on Legal Philosophy 23-48 (Hart Publishing 2018)

In this paper, I argue that American conflicts scholars in the late-nineteenth and early twentieth century were committed to monism: the view that necessarily one, and only one, legal system exists.

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