1.    Ross notes that “The main argument relied on by all my critics is that, when the sequence of time is taken into account, there is no contradiction between art. 88 and art. 88': art. 88 ceases to be valid law from the moment, art. 88' comes into force.” Why isn’t that enough to solve the paradox?

2.     This is what Peter Suber, in his PARADOX OF SELF-AMENDMENT 6.B (1990), has to say about Ross’s solution to the paradox:
He does not justify the principle except as a principle of logic, in which guise it is unassailable. If the richness and historical contingency of the world of law does contain rules that permit the derivation of conflicting rules, then Ross has adopted a principle that prevents him from seeing that fact and that actually requires him to deny it. He is guilty of the arrogance of a priori thinking about an empirical subject. There are no errors in his reasoning, only in his choice of premises, and in his presumption that what logic forbids, law must forbid. If the existing legal rules seem to permit what logic forbids, then the philosopher or logician is within her rights to complain and to suggest what seem to her to be improvements. But if she is bent on explanation, then the makeshift of a tacit, transcendent, immutable rule, universal across all systems, authorizing exactly what must be authorized, is comical and unscientific, blind to the legal concept of legal validity.

Is Suber right? Does Ross appeal to a “tacit, transcendent, immutable rule, universal across all legal systems?”

3.    Are there other cases  that area analogous to the paradox of self-amendment - that is, cases in which an empowered lawmaker seeks to change its empowerment?