Questions on Supplemental Jurisdiction
The Glannon is quite good here. Study his questions carefully.
In addition, consider the following:
1. Why is supplemental jurisdiction a good idea?
2. Try to figure out a way of distinguishing between cases
that (prior to supplemental jurisdiction) were called ancillary and
those that were called pendent.
3. When considering supplemental jurisdiction, there are three
questions to think about. First of all, what is the constitutional
scope of supplemental jurisdiction? In other words, when is a cause of
action that does not have federal subject matter jurisdiction
on its own so closely related to a cause of action that does
have federal subject matter jurisdiction on its own that they are part
of the same constitutional "case or controversy"? The second and third
questions concern the following issue: Even if supplemental
jurisdiction is constitutionally allowable, is it statutorily
allowable? This question has two answers. Before section 1367 was
enacted, to determine whether supplemental jurisdiction (then called
either pendent or ancillary jurisdiction) was statutorily allowable,
one had to look to the purposes of the statute that provided the main
cause of action with federal subject matter jurisdiction. For example,
if the main cause of action was allowable under 1332 (diversity), then
one had to look to the purposes of 1332 to see if a court's exercising
supplemental jurisdiction over a related cause of action would have
been considered statutorily allowable. After 1367 was enacted, one only
had to look to 1367 to determine whether it was statutorily allowable.
You need to know the old, pre-1367, statutory method because you need
to understand pre-1367 cases.
4. In addition to answering the constitutional and statutory
questions of whether supplemental jurisdiction is allowed, you need to
answer the question of whether joinder is allowable under the joinder
rules. If the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not allow the cause
of action to be joined, then it won't help that the cause of action has
supplemental jurisdiction.
5) Consider the following cases:
a) P (NY) sues D1 (NJ) for battery in federal court, asking for $100K.
P joins a battery action against D2 (NY) (also a participant in the
brawl) under R 20(a).
b) A (Cal.) sues E (Nev.) (B’s employer) in federal court for a battery
committed by B (Cal) against A during the course of B’s employment (the
two had a fight in the store). E impleads B for indemnification. B then
brings a suit against A on the harm done to B in their fight.
c) P (NY) sues D1 (NY) in federal court under federal securities laws.
P joins a state common law fraud claim against D2 (NY), an auditor for
D1 and was also responsible for the fraud.
d) P (Cal) sues D1 (Cal) under federal securities law and joins
a state law fraud claim against D2 (Cal) under state common law fraud.
e) Same as d, except P also joins a state law action for a battery
occurring a few weeks before the fraud against D1.
f) P (Cal) sues D (Cal) under federal securities laws. D joins an
action against P for battery, asking for $100k.
g) P (Cal) sues D (Ore) for state law breach of contract, asking for
$100K. D joins an action against P for battery, asking for $25k.
h) P (Cal) sues D (Ore) for state law breach of contract asking for
100k. D joins two actions against P. One for battery, asking for $50k
another for a different incident of battery, asking for $50K.
i) P (Cal) sues D (Cal) under federal securities laws for $50K. P joins
an action against D for battery, asking for $50K.
j) P (NY) sues D (NJ) for battery asking for $100K. D impleads X (NY) a
joint tortfeasor for contribution. X joins an action against P for his
damages in the brawl. In response P brings an action against X for his
damages in the brawl.
k) P (NY) sues D (NJ) for battery asking for $100K. D impleads X (NY) a
joint tortfeasor for contribution. P joins an action against X for his
damages in the brawl.
l) P (NY) sues D1 (NJ) for state law battery asking $100k and D2 (of
NJ) for state law battery concerning the same brawl asking $25K.
m) P1 (NY) and P2 (NY) sue D (Cal) for battery. Both are suing D for
$100k. D brings a counterclaim against P1 for her damages in the brawl,
asking for 100K. P1 impleads his insurance company X (NY) and joins a
contribution against P2.
Questions on Allapattah.
1. What are the theories of statutory interpretation expressed in
Kennedy's and Ginsburg's opinions in Allapattah? How justified is each?
2. Is Kennedy's ultimate reading of 1367(b) plausible? Does it make
sense for Congress to allow supplemental jurisdiction for plaintiffs
permissively joined under Rule 20, but not for plaintiffs that must be
joined under Rule 19?
3. Why should supplemental jurisdiction be allowed, according to
Kennedy's interpretation of 1367, for plaintiffs joined under Rule 20
who do not meet the jurisdictional minumum, and yet not be allowed if
they
are not diverse? Does this make any sense at all?
4. What does 1367(d) do? Some have worried that this provision is
unconstitutional? Why do you think this is a worry?
5. Consider the following scenarios:
a) P1 (NY) sues D (NJ) under state law battery for $100k and joins with
P2 (NY) who sues D for $25K concerning the same battery.
(How does Kennedy's theory handle this case? How does Ginsburg's?)
b) P(NY) sues D1(NJ) under state law battery for $100K and joins an
action against D2(NJ) for $25K concerning the same battery.
(How does Kennedy's theory handle this case? How does Ginsburg's?)
c) P1(NY) sues D (NJ) under state law battery for $100k and joins with
P2 (NJ) who sues D for $100K concerning the same battery.
(How does Kennedy's theory handle this case? How does Ginsburg's?)
d) P1 (NY) sues D (NJ) under state law battery for $100k. D makes a
motion to join P2 (NY) as a necessary party. P2s claim against D is for
$25K.
(How does Kennedy's theory handle this case? How does Ginsburg's?)
e) P1 (NY) sues D (NJ) under state law battery for $100k. P2 (NY)
intervenes of right with a claim of only $25K.
(How does Kennedy's theory handle this case? How does Ginsburg's?)