Question on Pendent and Ancillary Jurisdicition
1. When considering pendent and ancillary jurisdiction, there are two
questions to think about. First of all, what is the constitutional
scope of supplemental jurisdiction? In other words, when is a cause of
action that does not have federal subject matter jurisdiction
on its own so closely related to a cause of action that does
have federal subject matter jurisdiction on its own that they are part
of the same constitutional "case or controversy"? The second question
concerns the following issue: Even if supplemental
jurisdiction is constitutionally allowable, is it statutorily
allowable? This question has two answers. Before section 1367 was
enacted, to determine whether supplemental jurisdiction (then called
either pendent or ancillary jurisdiction) was statutorily allowable,
one had to look to the purposes of the statute that provided the main
cause of action with federal subject matter jurisdiction. For example,
if the main cause of action was allowable under 1332 (diversity), then
one had to look to the purposes of 1332 to see if a court's exercising
supplemental jurisdiction over a related cause of action would have
been considered statutorily allowable. After 1367 was enacted, one only
had to look to 1367 to determine whether it was statutorily allowable.
You need to know the old, pre-1367, statutory method because you need
to understand pre-1367 cases.
2. Look at the exercise of pendent jurisdiction in United Mine
Workers
v. Gibbs, which is a pre-section 1367 case. In the reading, is there
any discussion
about whether pendent jurisdiction is statutorily allowed? Why do you
think
it is statutorily allowed?
3. Look at the exercise of ancillary jurisdiction in Revere Copper,
which is also a pre-1367 case. In the reading, is there any discussion
about whether ancillary jurisdiction is statutorily allowed? Why do you
think it is statutorily allowed?
4. Think about the following issues in connection with the Kroger
case.
a. Was the exercise of ancillary jurisdiction constitutionally
allowable in the Kroger case?
b. Why did the Court claim that the exercise of ancillary
jurisdiction was not statutorily allowed? What were the purposes of the
diversity statute that were frustrated?
c. Does Kroger mean that Revere Copper was wrongly decided?
d. Justice White claims that ancillary jurisdiction should be
allowed because the plaintiff was using it to bring a cause of action
against a non-diverse party who was already in the case. Why does he
think that the fact that the cause of action was against someone who
was already a party in the case is important? Who is right, White or
Stewart?
5. What did the Finley case decide? Was it correctly decided? Was it
a good idea for Congress to abrogate Finley by statute (in 1367)?