My work in the philosophy of law has largely concerned four topics:

1) the writings of Hans Kelsen,

2) the (general) irrelevance of the philosophy of language for the philosophy of law (or what I call “Dworkin’s Fallacy”), 

3) American legal realism, and

4) the structure of legal systems.

But I have also written on some issues in analytical jurisprudence, and I have done a bit of blogging on the philosophy of law.

A video of a response I gave to paper on Raz can be found here.

I have also posted reviews of articles in the philosophy of law on Jotwell, including:

Stephen Finlay & David Plunkett, Quasi-Expressivism about Statements of Law: A Hartian Theory, in 3 Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Law 49 (John Gardner, Leslie Green & Brian Leiter eds., 2018).

Christopher M. Newman, Hohfeld and the Theory of In Rem Rights: An Attempted Mediation in The Legacy of Wesley Hohfeld (forthcoming 2018)

Timothy Endicott, Comity among Authorities, 68 Current Legal Problems 1 (2015).

Scott Hershovitz, The End of Jurisprudence, 124 Yale L.J. 1160 (2015)

Ronald Dworkin, A New Philosophy for International Law, 41 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 2 (2013)

Karl N. Llewellyn, The Theory of Rules, edited and with an introduction by Frederick Schauer (Univ. of Chicago Press, 2011)

Caleb Nelson, A Critical Guide to Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 54 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. (forthcoming 2013) 

Jeffrey Brand-Ballard, Innocents Lost: Proportional Sentencing and the Paradox of Collateral Damage, 15 Legal Theory 67 (2009)

Julie Dickson, Is the Rule of Recognition Really a Conventional Rule?, 27 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 373 (2007)

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