1. The decision in Erie was allegedly derived from the U.S. Constitution. Can the same thing be said about York? Was the application of the state statute of limitations rather than the federal tolling doctrine required under the U.S. Constitution? If not, what required it?

2. Consider the following rule: To get into federal court you must go through a metal detector. Assume that in state court the rule is you don't. Under York, should the state rule apply in federal court in a diversity case?

3. Consider why Ragan, Woods, and Cohen came out the way they did under York.

4. It seems pretty clear that in the Byrd case the state rule is outcome determinative. Why then is the federal rule used? Can the result be squared with York?

5. The Hanna court argues for a particular interpretation of York's outcome determinative test, such that not every procedural rule will be understood as outcome determinative. Is that interpretation compatible with what was said in York? Look at the procedural rule at issue in York. Was York wrongly decided according to the Hanna court's test?

6. The Hanna court claims that Erie is not the test for determining whether a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure can be used in a diversity case. Why? Why was Erie used in cases like Klaxon, York, Ragan, Woods, Cohen, and Byrd but not in Hanna? What's the difference?

7. What is the test for determining if a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure can be used in a diversity case? Can you think of an example where a Federal Rule would fail this test?

8. What about federal statutes regulating procedure? How does one determine whether they can be used in a diversity case? If Congress passed a statute spelling out choice-of-law rules or statutes of limitations to be used in diversity cases would it be OK for a federal court to use them? Or would that be contrary to the Supreme Court's decisions in Klaxon, Ragan, and York?

9. What is Harlan's solution to the Erie problem? Is it workable?