Questions on Shady Grove
1) How can a horizontal choice-of-law analysis help in understanding
Shady Grove? Imagine that a class action for statutory penaties under
Pennsylvania law had been brought in state court in New York. Would
section 901 have
applied? Imagine that a class action for statutory penaties under New
York law had been brought in state court in Pennsylvania. Would section
applied? Is Stevens right that section 901 is procedural for
2) Is Scalia right that FRCP 23 can apply even if section 901 is
understood as substantive? What does this suggest about the
power of state courts to preempt the substantive law of sister states
with their own procedural law?
3) Is there really any way to tell whether section 901 is substantive
or procedural for horizontal choice-of-law purposes? When would a New
York state court have occasion to address the matter?
4) What is Ginsburg's argument? Is she saying that section 901 should
be used because it is substantive for choice-of-law purposes or because
of the twin aims (or both)?
Questions on Klaxon
What is the source of the conclusion in Klaxon? Is it the twin aims
(that is, the goal of vertical uniformity)? Or is it based on the
constitutional requirement, as expressed in Erie, that federal courts
respect the content of state law?