Philosophy of Law
NOTE: The following is provisional only. There will unquestionably be changes (mostly deletions) in the course of the semester.
I. Is there a duty to obey the law?
M.B.E. Smith, Is There a Prima Facie Obligation to
Obey the Law?, 82 Yale L.J. 950 (1973) [available on JSTOR]
William A. Edmundson, State of the Art: The Duty to Obey the Law, 10 Legal Theory 215 (2004) [available here] pp. 245-52 only
II. Is a duty to obey necessary for political legitimacy?
Arthur Isak Applbaum, Legitimacy without the Duty to Obey, 38 Philosophy and Public Affairs 215 (2010) [available on Wiley]
Read only: Introduction ( p. 215); first two paragraphs of section II (pp.
217-18); section III (pp. 220-22); sections V-VII, pp. 224-233; section IX, pp. 234-39.
III. The idea of theory of law
Scott J. Shapiro, Legality (2011) Ch. 1 (go to the W&M library webpage, search for the book and you will find online access)
IV. Theories of law: The possibility puzzle
Shapiro, Legality Ch. 2
V. Austin's command theory of law
Shapiro, Legality Ch. 3
VI. Hart's social-rule theory of law
Shapiro, Legality Ch. 4
VII. Intermission I: What is the rule of recognition
for the American legal system?
Kent Greenawalt, The Rule of
Recognition and the Constitution, 85 Mich. L. Rev. 621 (1987)
[available on WESTLAW]
- do not read Part II, pp. 624-30, or
Part VIII.C, pp. 662-70
VIII. Intermission II: The paradox of self-amendment
Alf Ross, On Self-Reference and a Puzzle in Constitutional Law, 78 Mind 1-24 (1969) [available on JSTOR] - read ONLY pp. 1-7 and pp. 20-24.
IX. Dworkin's critique of Hart
Scott Shapiro, The Hart-Dworkin Debate: A Short Guide for the Perplexed [on SSRN] (read only up to p. 41)
X. Dworkin's interpretive theory of law
Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire Chs. 2 & 3
XI. The planning theory of law
Scott Shapiro, The Planning Theory of Law
XII. The puzzle of authority
Joseph Raz, Authority, Law, and Morality, 68 Monist (1985) [available on JSTOR] - up to. 305 only
Scott Shapiro, Authority- up to p. 52 only
XIII. Inclusive and exclusive legal positivism
Shapiro, Legality Ch. 9
XIV. Legal realism and rule-skepticism
Felix Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 Colum. L. Rev. 809 (1935) - pp. 809-12, 820-21, 834-49 only
Brian Leiter, American Legal Realism (will get)
XV. The moral impact theory of law
Mark Greenberg, The Moral Impact Theory of Law, 123 Yale L.J. 1288 (2014)
Scott Herhovitz, The End of Jurisprudence, 124 Yale L.J. 1160 (2015)
XVI. International law
Ronald Dworkin, A New Philosophy for International Law, 41 Phil. & Pub. Affairs 2 (2013)
XVII. The relevance of semantics to legal interpretation
David Brink, Legal Theory, Legal Interpretation, and Judicial Review, 17 Phil. & Public Affairs 105-07, 111-24 (1988) [JSTOR]