Syllabus
Philosophy of Law
Spring 2017

NOTE: The following is provisional only. There will unquestionably be changes (mostly deletions) in the course of the semester.

I. Is there a duty to obey the law?
    M.B.E. Smith, Is There a Prima Facie Obligation to Obey the Law?, 82 Yale L.J. 950 (1973) [available on JSTOR]
Study Questions
Study Questions
Study Questions
    William A. Edmundson, State of the Art: The Duty to Obey the Law, 10 Legal Theory 215 (2004) [available here] pp. 245-52 only

II. Is a duty to obey necessary for political legitimacy?
   
Arthur Isak Applbaum, Legitimacy without the Duty to Obey, 38 Philosophy and Public Affairs 215 (2010) [available on Wiley]
    Read only: Introduction ( p. 215); first two paragraphs of section II (pp. 217-18); section III (pp. 220-22); sections V-VII, pp. 224-233; section IX, pp. 234-39.
Study Questions
Study Questions

III. The idea of theory of law
    Scott J. Shapiro, Legality (2011) Ch. 1 (go to the W&M library webpage, search for the book and you will find online access)

IV. 
Theories of law: The possibility puzzle
  Shapiro, Legality Ch. 2

V. Austin's command theory of law
  
Shapiro, Legality Ch. 3

VI. Hart's social-rule theory of law
   
Shapiro, Legality Ch. 4

VII. Intermission I: What is the rule of recognition for the American legal system?
    Kent Greenawalt, The Rule of Recognition and the Constitution, 85 Mich. L. Rev. 621 (1987) [available on WESTLAW]
- do not read Part II, pp. 624-30, or Part VIII.C, pp. 662-70
Study Questions
VIII. Intermission II: The paradox of self-amendment
    Alf Ross, On Self-Reference and a Puzzle in Constitutional Law, 78 Mind 1-24 (1969) [available on JSTOR] 
- read ONLY pp. 1-7 and pp. 20-24.
Study Questions

IX. 
Dworkin's critique of Hart
   
Scott Shapiro, The Hart-Dworkin Debate: A Short Guide for the Perplexed [on SSRN] (read only up to p. 41)

Study Questions

X. Dworkin's interpretive theory of law
    Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire Chs. 2 & 3


XI. The planning theory of law
    
Scott Shapiro, The Planning Theory of Law

XII. The puzzle of authority
   
Joseph Raz, Authority, Law, and Morality, 68 Monist (1985) [available on JSTOR] - up to. 305 only
    Scott Shapiro, Authority
- up to p. 52 only

XIII.  Inclusive and exclusive legal positivism

    Shapiro, Legality Ch. 9

XIV. Legal realism and rule-skepticism
    
Felix Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 Colum. L. Rev. 809 (1935) - pp. 809-12, 820-21, 834-49 only
    Brian Leiter, American Legal Realism (will get)

XV. The moral impact theory of law
    Mark Greenberg, The Moral Impact Theory of Law, 123 Yale L.J. 1288 (2014)
    Scott Herhovitz, The End of Jurisprudence, 124 Yale L.J. 1160 (2015)

XVI. International law
    Ronald Dworkin, A New Philosophy for International Law, 41 Phil. & Pub. Affairs 2 (2013)
 
XVII. The relevance of semantics to legal interpretation
    David Brink, Legal Theory, Legal Interpretation, and Judicial Review, 17 Phil. & Public Affairs 105-07, 111-24 (1988) [JSTOR]