* 1. Shapiro’s Criticism of Raz’s Approach to authority: 5 scenarios Raz claims where authority may exist
		1. Expertise:
			1. Example: Doctor said, “take the blue pill.”
			2. Raz’s theory:
				1. When the government issues the regulation, it creates a reason for action that displaces the reasons for action that originally has - You don’t need to consider all the reasons.
				2. When you follow the government’s regulation, it is more likely that you will abide by your reasons for action than think it by yourself
			3. Simpler Theory:
				1. The regulation is not a reason to action, but a reason to **believe** about my reasons to action. Then based on that belief, a person will make a decision by consider all the reasons.
				2. So when the gov’t says take the blue pill I believe that there are medical reasons to do so. With that new belief I act on the balance of reasons of which I am aware.
		2. Bias:
			1. Giving the dispute to an arbitrator because we know in that situation we are more likely to do what we ought to do than when we try to figure it out ourselves
			2. Problem:
			- why not understand the arbitrator as creating a reason for belief
				1. The arbitrator’s decision for the other side gives me a reason to believe that the other side is right
				2. With that new belief I act and the balance of reasons of which I am aware.
		3. Costliness of Deliberation
			1. Rather than thinking about every reason to decide what is a good choice, we can rely on the authority - The government has made it cheaper to do the right thing than we all make our own reasoning by ourselves.
			2. Problem:
			- Once again, this may still be a reason to believe, rather than reasons for action
				1. The government simply provides us a reason to believe that pre-existing reasons for action favor doing the thing the authority says
				2. With that new belief I act on the basis of the reasons for action of which I am aware
		4. Coordination:
			1. Example: Which side of the street should I drive on?
			2. Cannot make the right decision individually because it depends on what everyone else think which side they should drive
			3. Government said, “drive on the right.”
				1. Raz: This instruction/order **supplants** your reasons for action
				2. Problem: It creates a new belief - Other people are likely to drive on the right side

Because it is now salient

* + 1. Prisoner’s Dilemmas
			1. Examples where everyone making rational choice of dominant strategy makes everyone worse off
			2. eg should I pollute?
				1. Either other people are going to pollute or they are not
				2. If they are going to pollute then I might as well – my pollution won’t make the messed up water and air any worse
				3. If they are not, then I might as well pollute – my pollution won’t make the wonderful water and air any worse
				4. So I might as well pollute no matter what
				5. But everyone has the same reasoning and we end up with a polluted world
			3. PD can also arise if assume the people are not selfish, but that they are attempting to act on the basis of the moral reasons for action of which they are aware.
				1. Either other people are going to pollute or they are not
				2. If they are going to pollute then I have no moral reason not to pollute – my pollution won’t make the messed up water and air any worse
				3. If they are not, then I I have not moral reason not to pollute – my pollution won’t make the wonderful water and air any worse
				4. So it is morally permissible to pollute no matter what
				5. But everyone has the same reasoning and we end up with a polluted world
	1. Is Raz right that the authority will help you to make the right decision not to pollute.
		+ 1. How does authority solve this problem without sanctions?
				1. Note: everyone agrees that a system of sanctioning defectors is a possibility for overcoming prisoner’s dilemmas.
			2. Assume the selfish version of the PD
				1. If the authority gets you not to pollute, isn’t it really encouraging you to act against your (selfish) reasons for actions? How is the authority helping you abide by the reasons that apply to you?
			3. Assume the moral version of PD
				1. If you already have a moral reason not to pollute even when every other person does, then you would not pollute even there is no authority

So the authority is unnecessary

* + - * 1. On the other hand if you don’t have a moral reason not to pollute when every other person does, then how does the authority’s directive solve the problem? – doesn’t it give the wrong answer?
			1. How about this idea

Even though my action will not make a practical difference, I have a reason not to pollute if other people in general are also not polluting (this is tied to the duty of fair play). On the other hand, if other people are polluting, I have no moral reason to not pollute.

This puts me into a coordination problem. I need an assurance that other people will not pollute

But how can the gov’t give me this assurance without sanctions? And even if it can, all it has done is given me a reason for belief, not a reason for action.

* Don’t confuse authority in Raz’s sense with the power to compel obedience
* An authority can be on Mars communicating to us via radio

Shapiro: one problem is that for Raz is we seem to be making a *decision* to follow the authority

* But if we decide to follow the authority, then the reasons that recommend the following the authority are sufficient to do what the authority says
* We appear to be acting on the balance of reasons of which we are aware after all

Shapiro’s solution – authority has the same purposes that Raz suggests but we follow authorities by making it such that we do what they say w/o deliberating

* We in effect bind ourselves

Consider the phenomenon of planning

Say I have a plan to cook dinner

* Having made that plan and should not reconsider it absent compelling circumstances
* The plan makes it rational not too decide